The American midterm elections have delivered a warning to the political Right that extends well beyond Washington. Donald Trump’s Republican Party has suffered a significant electoral setback, with Democrats making major gains and capturing the Senate, the House of Representatives and the gubernatorial posts. Among the emerging figures is Abdul El-Sayed, whose rise in Michigan reflects the growing visibility of Muslim politicians within the American Left.
But America is not an isolated case.
In Brazil, the Bolsonaro political movement has failed to reclaim the presidency. In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu has struggled to secure a parliamentary majority, while Arab political parties have gained greater significance in the country’s electoral arithmetic. Different countries, different political realities, but an increasingly familiar pattern: right-wing political establishments are facing mounting challenges from increasingly consolidated opposition forces.
What makes these developments particularly interesting is that the opposition is not necessarily united by a common ideology. Left-wing activists, liberal voters, minority communities and regional political formations often have very different priorities. Yet, when confronted with a common political adversary, they have demonstrated an ability to find electoral common ground.
For the Right, this presents a challenge that goes beyond losing individual elections. It raises questions about the durability of its voter coalitions, its ability to respond to changing political aspirations and, perhaps most importantly, its capacity to prevent disparate opposition groups from coming together.
Is this the beginning of a broader global retreat of the Right, or are we witnessing a new phase of electoral politics in which coalition-building matters more than ideological strength? Is the Right beginning to lose the arithmetic?
Brazil: The Bolsonaro Movement Fails to Reclaim Power
Brazil offers one of the clearest examples of the difficulties confronting the global Right. Jair Bolsonaro’s political movement, which once transformed the country’s political landscape, has struggled to translate its considerable electoral support into a lasting hold over power.
Bolsonaro’s defeat in the 2022 presidential election to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was narrow. Lula secured 50.9 per cent of the vote against Bolsonaro’s 49.1 per cent, exposing just how deeply divided Brazilian society had become. But the bigger test for the Brazilian Right came with the question of whether the Bolsonaro brand could survive beyond Bolsonaro himself.
Lula wins elections in Brazil, making a dramatic comeback.The answer has proved complicated. In the 2026 presidential election, Lula defeated Flávio Bolsonaro, Jair Bolsonaro’s son, in the October runoff, securing 51.8 per cent of the vote against his opponent’s 48.2 per cent. The attempt to transfer the political legacy of Bolsonaro to the next generation had failed to bring the presidency back to the Right.
There is, however, an important distinction. Bolsonaro’s political movement has not disappeared. The Right continues to command considerable support in Brazil’s Congress, and its electoral base remains substantial. What it has struggled to achieve is a broad enough coalition to regain control of the presidency.
This is where the Brazilian experience becomes particularly relevant. A political movement can retain a loyal ideological base and still struggle to win a national election. Lula’s victory suggests that the ability to bring together different constituencies, including working-class voters, sections of the urban electorate and those opposed to Bolsonaro’s political legacy, can prove decisive.
For the Brazilian Right, the challenge is no longer simply about defending Bolsonaro’s record. It is about finding a political identity that can appeal beyond his established support base.
And that is perhaps the first lesson emerging from Brazil: a movement may survive the defeat of its leader, but surviving electorally and returning to power are two very different things.
Israel: Netanyahu’s Electoral Setback and the Growing Influence of Arab Parties
In Israel, where Benjamin Netanyahu has dominated national politics for much of the past decade, the latest election has exposed a significant weakness in the country’s right-wing political establishment. Despite emerging as the largest individual political party, Netanyahu’s Likud has failed to translate its electoral performance into a parliamentary majority. More importantly, the changing balance of power has brought Arab-led political parties into a position of unprecedented significance.
The October 2026 election left Netanyahu’s coalition with 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, eight short of the 61 required to form a government. The opposition bloc secured 48 seats, while Arab-led parties collectively won 19. The latter figure is particularly significant, representing a substantial increase from their combined tally of 10 seats in the previous election. The final count was released on October 30, with formal certification scheduled for November 4.
Leading opposition candidate Gadi Eisenkot of Yashar.The numbers tell an interesting story. Netanyahu’s political alliance, which held 68 seats in the outgoing parliament, has lost its majority. Meanwhile, the two Arab-led formations, the Joint List and Ra’am, have emerged as potentially decisive players in determining who governs Israel next.
This does not mean that the Arab parties have automatically aligned themselves with the Israeli Left or that they constitute a unified political bloc. They have different political positions and strategic priorities. However, their combined parliamentary strength has made it considerably more difficult for Netanyahu’s opponents to form a government without either a Unity government that now seems unlikely or engaging with Arab political representatives.
That possibility also exposes the contradictions within the Israeli opposition. Several parties opposed to Netanyahu have been reluctant to cooperate with Arab-led formations, complicating efforts to assemble a viable alternative government. The opposition may have the numbers to challenge Netanyahu, but whether it can overcome its own political differences remains uncertain.
There is another dimension to this development. Arab citizens constitute a significant minority within Israel, and their political representation has frequently been central to discussions about the country’s democratic character. Their increased parliamentary presence gives them greater leverage in a political system where even a handful of seats can determine the fate of a government.
For Netanyahu, the setback is particularly consequential. His political survival has long depended on maintaining a coalition of right-wing, religious and nationalist parties. The latest election suggests that this arrangement is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of growing left, liberal and Muslim cooperation.
The larger lesson is that electoral strength and the ability to govern are not necessarily the same thing. A political establishment can remain influential, retain its ideological base and even emerge with the largest individual party, yet find itself unable to command a parliamentary majority.
In Israel, the Right has not been voted out of existence. But it has lost the political arithmetic that once made its dominance appear almost inevitable.
United States: The Democratic Wave and the Rise of a New Political Coalition
If Brazil demonstrated the difficulties of sustaining a right-wing political movement beyond its principal leader, the United States has offered something more consequential: a direct electoral rebuke to a sitting Republican administration.
The November 3 midterm elections have dealt Donald Trump and the Republican Party a major setback. Democrats have won control of the Senate, flipping several Republican-held seats, and are closing in on a majority in the House of Representatives. The party has also made significant gains in gubernatorial contests, including victories in traditionally Republican states. For Trump, who campaigned extensively for Republican candidates, the results represent a serious setback barely two years into his second presidency.
The reasons behind the Democratic resurgence are not particularly difficult to identify. The American electorate has been grappling with rising living costs, inflation, economic uncertainty and dissatisfaction with the administration’s priorities. The war with Iran and questions surrounding the government’s handling of domestic affairs have added to the discontent. For many voters, the midterms became an opportunity to register their dissatisfaction with the President without waiting for the next presidential election.
The United States Capitol Building.But beyond the Republican losses, another development deserves attention: the changing character of the Democratic Party and the growing influence of its progressive wing.
One of the most interesting examples is Abdul El-Sayed, the Muslim-American politician who became the Senator of Michigan defeating Republic Mike Rogers, the first Muslim senator in US history. Previously, El-Sayed defeated establishment-backed Congresswoman Haley Stevens in the Democratic Senate primary in August, despite facing a considerable financial disadvantage. His campaign was built around economic populism, universal healthcare, campaign finance reform and opposition to American military assistance to Israel.
His candidacy has also brought questions of Muslim political representation, the Gaza conflict and America’s relationship with Israel into the centre of an important Senate contest. The divisions within the Democratic establishment became particularly visible when Stevens subsequently endorsed Republican candidate Mike Rogers, citing her disagreements with El-Sayed.
His rise also belongs to a wider story. Muslim-American politicians have become increasingly visible in American public life, while progressive candidates have sought to build coalitions around economic inequality, healthcare, immigration and foreign policy, particularly in relation to Israel.
This is precisely what makes the American experience interesting. The Democratic Party’s electoral gains have brought together constituencies that do not necessarily share the same ideological outlook but increasingly see common ground in opposing the Republican administration.
For the Republicans, the problem is therefore twofold. They must contend with voter dissatisfaction over governance while confronting an opposition that has demonstrated its ability to unite different constituencies behind a common electoral objective.
The American midterms offer perhaps the clearest illustration of a larger political lesson: an incumbent can retain a loyal ideological base and still lose an election when its opponents succeed in bringing together everyone else.
The Emerging Global Pattern: An Unlikely Coalition Against the Right
Brazil, Israel and the United States are vastly different political environments. Their electoral systems, demographic compositions, ideological divisions and national priorities have little in common. Yet, the recent developments in all three countries point towards an interesting political phenomenon: the ability of fragmented opposition constituencies to come together against established right-wing leadership.
This is not necessarily an ideological victory for the Left. In fact, many of the groups contributing to these electoral shifts have little in common beyond their opposition to the incumbent political establishment. Progressive activists, liberals, minority communities, working-class voters and regional political formations often have competing interests. But electoral politics does not always require ideological uniformity. Sometimes, a common opponent is enough to bring otherwise disparate groups together.
The growing political significance of Muslim constituencies is particularly worth examining. In Israel, Arab-led parties have acquired greater parliamentary importance. In the United States, Muslim politicians such as Abdul El-Sayed are increasingly visible within the Democratic Party’s progressive wing. These developments are not identical, nor do they suggest a coordinated international political movement. However, they demonstrate how minority political mobilisation can influence electoral outcomes, particularly when the balance of power is closely contested.
Ilhan Omar, Zohran Mamdani and El-Sayed, three of the leading “progressive” voices within the Democratic Party.There is also a broader electoral calculation at work. Minority voters, particularly when concentrated in competitive constituencies, can become decisive. Their influence extends beyond their numerical strength when political parties actively seek their support and incorporate their concerns into wider electoral platforms.
At the same time, the Left appears to have become more effective at connecting different forms of dissatisfaction. Economic inequality, immigration, healthcare, identity politics, foreign policy and opposition to established leadership are being brought together under broader political narratives. This allows progressive parties to appeal to voters who may not necessarily identify themselves as left-wing.
The Right, meanwhile, faces a different challenge. Its traditional electoral coalitions are often built around a combination of nationalism, cultural conservatism, religious identity, economic aspirations and strong leadership. These remain powerful political forces. But when economic dissatisfaction grows, regional interests diverge or leadership becomes unpopular, maintaining that coalition becomes considerably more difficult.
It would, however, be premature to declare a worldwide decline of conservatism. Right-wing parties continue to enjoy considerable support across Europe, Latin America and Asia. Even in Brazil, the Bolsonaro movement retains substantial parliamentary influence. Electoral setbacks should not be confused with the disappearance of an ideology.
What is changing is perhaps the method through which political power is acquired and retained. The ability to build coalitions across social and ideological divisions is becoming just as important as the strength of an individual party’s traditional support base.
And this brings us to a question that is particularly relevant to India.
If opposition consolidation, minority mobilisation and economic dissatisfaction are becoming important features of electoral politics elsewhere, could similar calculations reshape India’s political landscape in 2027?
India 2027: Could the Global Political Shift Have an Indian Parallel?
India is not Brazil, Israel or the United States. The BJP’s organisational strength, its extensive electoral network, the popularity of Narendra Modi and the country’s distinct political and demographic realities make direct comparisons difficult. Yet, the developments unfolding across these democracies offer an important question for the Indian political establishment: what happens when an otherwise fragmented opposition discovers a common electoral strategy?
The year 2027 will be particularly important in answering that question. Seven states, including Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Gujarat, Uttarakhand, Goa, Manipur and Himachal Pradesh, are scheduled to hold Assembly elections. These contests will take place barely two years before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections and will offer an important indication of the political mood across the country.
For the BJP, the stakes extend beyond individual state governments. The party has built much of its political success around a combination of strong central leadership, Hindu consolidation, welfare delivery, nationalism and an extensive organisational network. This formula has proved electorally effective across multiple election cycles. However, the challenge for any dominant political formation is that the very coalition that brings it to power must continuously be maintained and expanded.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath.The 2024 Lok Sabha elections offered an important reminder of this reality. The BJP secured 240 seats, falling short of the 272 required for a parliamentary majority on its own. Although the NDA comfortably formed the government, the result demonstrated that the BJP’s electoral dominance was not immune to shifts in voter preferences. In Uttar Pradesh, particularly, the Samajwadi Party emerged as the single-largest party, winning 37 Lok Sabha seats against the BJP’s 33.
The opposition’s performance also revealed the importance of social coalition-building. The Samajwadi Party’s PDA strategy, bringing together Pichhda, Dalit and Alpsankhyak constituencies, sought to unite OBCs, Dalits and minorities under a common political framework. It was a strategy that went beyond traditional party loyalties and attempted to challenge the BJP’s electoral arithmetic at the constituency level.
This is perhaps the closest Indian parallel to the opposition consolidation visible in other democracies. Different communities do not necessarily share the same political priorities, but a common electoral platform can provide them with an opportunity to collectively challenge an incumbent.
This is where the international developments become relevant. The BJP does not necessarily face the same political circumstances as Netanyahu, Bolsonaro or Trump. But it could encounter a similar electoral challenge if opposition parties manage to bring together communities and voter groups that have historically voted differently.
The question for the Indian Right, therefore, is not simply whether it can retain its existing support base. It is whether it can prevent the consolidation of an alternative social and political coalition.
The Indian Right may have its own reasons to feel confident. But the international experience suggests that electoral dominance is rarely permanent, particularly when an opposition discovers how to make its numbers count.
What Should the Indian Right Learn from the Global Electoral Setbacks?
The international developments discussed above should not be read as a prediction of India’s political future. The BJP operates in a very different electoral environment, and its organisational strength, ideological positioning and welfare network give it advantages that cannot be directly compared with those of Bolsonaro’s political movement or Netanyahu’s coalition.
Yet, there are lessons worth considering.
1. Electoral coalitions require continuous expansion.
One of the biggest strengths of the BJP has been its ability to bring together voters across caste, class and regional boundaries under a broader political identity. However, no electoral coalition is permanent. The 2024 Lok Sabha results demonstrated that even established voter groups can shift their preferences when local concerns, candidate selection or political dissatisfaction influence their decisions.
The challenge is to retain traditional supporters while continuing to attract new constituencies.
2. Governance must remain ahead of political messaging.
The American midterms offer an important reminder that economic dissatisfaction can undermine even a politically energised incumbent. Voters may support a party’s ideological positions while simultaneously expressing dissatisfaction with inflation, employment opportunities, public services and local governance.
For the Indian Right, infrastructure development, welfare delivery, employment generation and economic aspirations must remain central to its political agenda. Cultural and ideological mobilisation can strengthen a political identity, but it cannot permanently substitute for governance.
3. Regional leadership matters as much as national popularity.
Bolsonaro’s electoral difficulties demonstrate the limitations of attempting to transfer a political legacy from one leader to another. Similarly, Netanyahu’s parliamentary setback illustrates how dependent political survival can become on coalition management.
The BJP’s national leadership remains a considerable electoral asset. However, its long-term political strength also depends on developing credible regional leadership capable of responding to local concerns without relying entirely on national campaigning.
4. The opposition must not be underestimated.
Perhaps the most important lesson from Brazil, Israel and the United States is that fragmented opposition groups can become formidable when they identify common electoral interests.
In India, the INDIA bloc’s performance in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections demonstrated the potential of opposition coordination, particularly in Uttar Pradesh. However, differences between regional parties, leadership ambitions and competing political interests continue to complicate the possibility of a durable national alliance.
The BJP would be making a strategic mistake if it assumed that these contradictions would automatically prevent opposition consolidation.
Ultimately, the Indian Right must recognise that electoral dominance is not simply a product of ideological conviction. It requires organisation, political adaptability, effective governance and the ability to continuously renew its relationship with voters.
The question is whether the BJP can anticipate these challenges before they translate into electoral setbacks.
(The author is the editor-in-chief of On Record India.)
